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Comunicat de presa: “Ioan Mircea Pascu, Vicepresedintele Parlamentului European, la Conferinta pentru securitate cibernetica de la Berlin: Statele membre ale Uniunii Europene trebuie sa fie solidare in cazul unul atac cibernetic”

March 28th, 2015

Europarlamentarul PSD Ioan Mircea Pascu, vicepresedinte al Parlamentului European si al Comisiei pentru afaceri externe a subliniat joi la Berlin, in interventia sa principala din cadrul conferintei internationale “Securitatea cibernetica in Europa”, importanta unei posibile invocari a clauzei de solidaritate a UE in cazul unui atac cibernetic major impotriva unui stat membru.
Semnificatia si mecanismele de implementare ale clauzei au fost evaluate de Ioan Mircea Pascu si in Raportul sau privind clauzele de aparare reciproca si de solidaritate ale UE: dimensiuni politice si operationale. Raportul Ioan Mircea Pascu a fost aprobat de Parlamentul European in noiembrie 2012. (textul raportului poate fi regasit aici: )
Ioan Mircea Pascu a punctat in interventia sa de la Berlin:
“Dependenta noastra din ce in ce mai mare de spatiul cibernetic creste si vulnerabilitatea asociata acestei dependente”. Securitatea cibernetica va continua sa ramana in urma atacurilor cibernetice. Desi o aparare mai buna va limita, cu siguranta, succesul unui atac cibernetic , contributia sa la descurajarea acestor atacuri va ramane limitata.
La ultimul summit al NATO, din Tara Galilor, NATO a decis ca atacurile cibernetice sunt parte a apararii colective fiind acoperite de Articolul 5 al Tratatului de la Washington, care ofera astfel, in egala egala masura, garantia apararii colective atat pentru atacurile virtuale cat si pentru cele fizice. Uniunea Europeana a declarat la randul ei, ca “un incident sau atact cibernetic deosebit de serios poate constitui un motiv suficient pentru invocarea de catre un stat membru al UE a clauzei de solidaritate (articolul 222 din Tratatul UE). Pe de alta parte, posibilitatea invocarii clauzei de aparare reciproca (articolul 42/7 al TEU) pentru atacuri cibernetice este destul de neclara, ceea ce reprezinta un dezavantaj pentru statele UE care nu sunt membre NATO.
Invocarea clauzei de solidaritate se refera exclusiv la gestionarea consecintelor unui atac cibernetic si nu la atacul in sine, ceea ce ridica intrebari privind valoarea sa de descurajare. Chiar daca functionarea clauzei de solidaritate are un numar de limitari, valoarea unei invocari este clara fiindca: ofera acces la resurse suplimentare; pentru ca pune in miscare o actiune colectiva care demostreaza solidaritate si pentru ca poate intia un proces de analiza a invatamintelor.
In Raportul meu din 2012 am exprimat in mod clar necesitatea accesibilitatii clauzei de aparare mutuala pentru statele membre ael UE in cazul unui atac cibernetic.
In lumea de astazi, cand suntem confruntati cu un conflict conventional in Europa, statele membre ale Uniunii au nevoie de actiune nu de cuvinte! Atentia noastra trebuie sa fie indreptata asupra consecintelor unui atac cibernetic si a efectului de incapacitare pe care acestea pot sa il aiba asupra capacitatii fizice a unui stat membru de a se apara.
In decembrie 1989, cu mult inaintea erei atacurilor cibernetice, radarele fortelor aeriene romane inregistrau imaginea unui atac aerian masiv care nu a existat in realitate. Aceasta « realitate virtuala non-existenta» urmarea luarea unor decizii si initierea unor actiuni gresite. Dar atunci Romania nu era nici membra a NATO, nici a Uniunii Europene. Sper ca faptul ca acum suntem membri NATO si UE va face diferenta necesara”
, a concluzionat vicepresedintele Parlamentului European, europarlamentarul PSD Ioan Mircea Pascu.

NATO’s Article 5 and Russian Hybrid Warfare

March 18th, 2015

Articolul a fost publicat initial de Atlantic Council

NATO’s Article 5 and Russian Hybrid Warfare



We warned last year (The Way to Avoid Wars: Article 5 and Strategic Reassurance Revisited) that any move by Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine would be highly destabilizing and have unpredictable results — probably including NATO countries providing logistical and intelligence support to Ukraine’s military, possibly going beyond that.
That is what has happened and that is where we are today, with the risk of direct confrontation between NATO and Russian forces greater now than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The situation is exacerbated by the growing appreciation that Russia has engaged in hybrid warfare against Ukraine and that such tactics could also be used against NATO countries. How should NATO respond?
A fundamental shift in strategy is required, recognizing that Russia is no longer a country we can rely on not to attack NATO members. Russia has become a potential threat to our territorial integrity which must once again be deterred.
There is no obligation for NATO to intervene in the conflict in Ukraine because Ukraine is not a member of the Alliance. Nevertheless, there are important issues at stake for NATO.
The first is respect for international law, which underpins international security. Whatever we may think of President Putin’s declaration that Russia will use all available means, including intervention under international humanitarian law, to defend the rights of Russian-speakers living abroad, we must reject and excoriate any interpretation of such policy to justify sending forces in disguise to support rebellions abroad and annex territory. If Russia believes it has the right to intervene in Ukraine under international humanitarian law, it should explain its case publicly – including the urgent humanitarian catastrophe it seeks to avert and why there is no alternative to its action – and be transparent about its actions. It should not act by stealth and revert to the “big lie”, denying that its forces are engaged, denying that its missile units shot down Malaysian airliner MH17, pretending to be the peacemaker when the reality is the opposite.
The second important issue for NATO is its formal commitment under the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter “to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and … the principle of inviolability of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole.” Although this stops well short of requiring specific actions by NATO, it does require NATO to react politically when Ukraine is attacked. For the NATO states who signed the 1994 Budapest Memorandum giving security assurances to Ukraine as a condition of its renunciation of its nuclear weapons, that requirement is underlined.
The third and most important issue for NATO is that, because of the commitments it has made to uphold peace and security in its region and specifically to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity, its credibility is now at stake. If NATO does not react effectively against Russia’s disguised hybrid warfare attack on Ukraine, deterrence in Europe will be weakened, making it more likely that the territory of NATO members will be attacked.
To respond effectively, NATO must face up to this challenge and draw on everything it has learned about how to counter aggression, while avoiding being drawn into direct conflict.
1) NATO nations must strengthen their support for Ukraine by imposing further political, diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia, and by supplying military equipment, training and intelligence to Ukraine, as well as economic and humanitarian support to those affected by the fighting. They should also help the Ukrainian authorities strengthen and demonstrate their attention to the concerns of their Russian-speaking citizens.
2) NATO must increase its efforts in public diplomacy to demonstrate Russia’s culpability for the conflict and to counter Russian propaganda. Russia must be labelled the aggressor and not allowed to pose as peacemaker.
3) NATO must urgently increase its readiness to conduct and sustain a major military operation in Eastern Europe should any of its members come under attack.
For NATO itself, the last is the most important. If we wish to deter any attack against NATO members, including hybrid warfare, we must demonstrate our determination, capability and readiness to do so.
While NATO’s recent announcement that it will establish six new command posts on its eastern borders and create a 5,000-strong rapid reaction force is welcome and goes in the right direction, it is not enough. To convince President Putin that any attack on NATO will be counter-productive for him, we must thoroughly transform NATO’s outlook and put it on a more immediate operational footing.
Russia needs to perceive that in the event of an attack against any NATO state, including a disguised hybrid attack, NATO will reinforce the Ally attacked with substantial conventional forces which it will be able to sustain indefinitely, that it will do so promptly regardless of whether the attack’s authorship is acknowledged, that there will be other repercussions including economic and political, and that NATO’s response will not necessarily be symmetrical or confined to direct defense of the Ally attacked.
To achieve this, NATO should immediately refocus its planning so as to be able to mount and sustain a major operation in Eastern Europe at a few weeks’ notice, supported by appropriate information operations, and it should urgently review operational sustainability against this background in consultation with industry. NATO defense planners should pinpoint key short-term deficiencies in C4ISR, interoperability and transport logistics which should be corrected or worked around. Allies should review and update their plans to deploy their forces together. The Secretary General and SACEUR should report on what additional flexibilities they need to redeploy resources. The NATO military authorities should develop appropriate retaliatory contingency plans. Manpower shortages and weapons stockpile vulnerabilities should be addressed.
Some will argue that steps such as these will be inflammatory and increase the risk of confrontation with Russia. On the contrary, NATO must mean business or go out of business. If we give the impression through lack of capability and readiness that we do not mean what we say when we promise to defend each other, we risk inviting potential aggressors to call our bluff with catastrophic results. Deterrence cannot be bluff; unsupported security commitments are the worst form of blunder.
Looked at with the benefit of hindsight, President Putin’s policy towards what he terms Russia’s “near abroad” appears consistent. He claims a sphere of influence for Russia and the right to protect Russian “compatriots” in the “Russian world” against their state authorities, unconstrained by law. These two assertions fit neatly together but are in conflict with the principles of the United Nations and the OSCE and of international law more generally.
In 2008 in Georgia, Russia’s actions were partially excused on the grounds that a pre-existing conflict had erupted. NATO’s reaction was muted. In 2014 in Crimea, no such confusion existed: overwhelming force was used to ram through annexation of territory. NATO’s reaction was less muted but not effective. In 2015 in Eastern Ukraine, Russia is on the verge of another land grab. This time NATO must react decisively.
To misquote Oscar Wilde, to overlook one aggression may be regarded as a misfortune, to ignore two looks like carelessness, not to respond appropriately to a third would be stupidity.
Edgar Buckley is a former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations and now an independent consultant. Ioan Pascu is Vice President of the European Parliament and former defence minister of Romania.

Comunicat de presa: “Raportorul Parlamentului European Ioan Mircea Pascu pentru situatia strategica si militara in bazinul Marii Negre dupa anexarea ilegala a Crimeii de catre Rusia: Este esential ca reasigurarea strategica pentru statele membre NATO si UE sa continue, in conditiile cresterii puterii militare a Rusiei in Marea Neagra”

March 17th, 2015

Subcomisia pentru securitate si aparare a Parlamentului European a dezbatut luni proiectul de raport al europarlamentarului PSD Ioan Mircea Pascu, vicepresedinte al Parlamentului European si al Comisiei pentru afaceri externe (AFET) privind situatia strategica militara in bazinul Marii Negre dupa anexarea ilegala a Crimeii de catre Rusia. Reprezentantii principalelor grupuri politice din Parlamentul European au subliniat importanta documentului, au apreciat si sustinut politic atat substanta raportului Pascu cat si recomandarile acestuia.
Ioan Mircea Pascu a punctat in interventia sa:
“In timp ce la Moscova se aniverseaza un an de cand Rusia a anexat ilegal Crimeea, noi credem ca ar fi mai potrivit sa vorbim despre o comemorare. Aceasta comemorare este cu atat mai semnificativa, cu cat presedintele Putin a recunoscut recent partiparea directa a ofiterilor de informatii ai fortelor armate ruse in Crimeea inainte de anexare (in pofida nenumaratelor declaratii oficiale de pana acum, care au negat orice implicare directa a militarilor rusi). Daca analizam situatia actuala din Europa de Est, atat cea din flancul nordic, cat si din flancul sudic, putem vedea ca pentru statele din flancul nordic, indeosebi pentru statele baltice care au facut parte din fosta Uniune Sovietica, exista o teama justificata si foarte importanta privind actiunile viitoare ale Rusiei, pentru ca nu se poate sti unde se va opri politica acesteia de recuperare, de “reconquista”. In acelasi timp, anexarea ilegala a Crimeii a generat o schimbare strategica majora concreta in flancul sudic. Prin anexarea intregii peninsule si nu doar a Sevastopului si a celorlalte doua baze navale adiacente pe care le-a avut inainte, Rusia si-a creat practic o platforma avansata de tipul Kaliningrad de la Marea Baltica, insa de data aceasta in Marea Neagra.
Situatia din Marea Neagra devine din ce in ce mai complexa. Pana la al doilea acord de la Minsk, Rusia a presat foarte mult pentru un coridor terestru care sa uneasca Crimea cu teritoriul controlat de Rusia in Ucraina (cu Mariupolul ca orasul cheie pentru acest efort) si a testat un al doilea coridor care ar uni Crimeea cu Transnistria (cu punctul cheie la Odesa), fara sa aiba o operatiune militara de amploarea celei de la Mariupol.
Acum un an, prezenta fortelor ruse din Crimeea era limitata la baza navala de la Sevastopol si altor doua baze navale adiacente pentru flota ruseasca a Marii Negre, la 2-3 aeroporturi si o brigada de infanterie marina care apara bazele existente. Dupa un an de la anexarea ilegala a Crimeii situatia strategica si militara din bazinul Marii Negre s-a schimbat dramatic: forta de aparare a flotei ruse la Marea Neagra devine in realitate o grupare militara de lovire, cu potential ofensiv insemnat, inclusiv de debarcare, in cazul in care Rusia intra in posesia navelor franceze de tip Mistral.
Cred ca echilibrul militar din regiune s-a schimbat in favoarea Rusiei desi NATO isi pastreaza superioritatea militara generala inclusiv prin capacitatile care pot fi aduse in Marea Neagra din alte zone. NATO a raspuns prin masuri de reasigurare strategica, inclusiv prin exercitii militare.
In contextul modificarii situatiei strategice trebuie, de asemenea, sa luam in considerare razboiul hibrid purtat de Rusia in Crimeea si in estul Ucrainei si actiunile de dezinformare care continua in domeniul propagandei.
Raportul va fi dezvoltat in etapa urmatoare prin includerea unor elemente privind dimensiunea nucleara a anexarii ilegale a Crimeii, avand in vedere declaratiile unor oficiali rusi, a situatiei minoritatilor, indeosebi a situatiei tatarilor si a intregii populatii din Crimeea, a situatiei din Georgia si a implicatiilor economice ale anexarii.
In 2008, la summitul NATO de la Bucuresti, Ucraina si Georgia au cerut sa primeasca planul de aderare la Alianta (Membership Action Plan – MAP). Putin a decis sa schilodeasca fizic aceste doua tari urmarind sa le faca neeligibile pentru a deveni membre NATO. Acest fapt genereaza o dilema morala si practica dificila pentru NATO.
In ciuda nerecunoasterii internationale a anexarii ilegale a Crimeii si a impunerii de sanctiuni, precum si a semnarii acordului Minsk 2 (care se refera la incetarea luptelor doar in estul Ucrainei) situatia peninsulei nu s-a schimbat. De aceea, orice dez-escaladare poate avea loc, in afara respectarii stricte a prevederilor Acordului Minsk 2, numai in condițiile revenirii la situația inițiala (status quo ante) a Crimeii ca parte a Ucrainei, precum si ale menținerii masurilor de reasigurare strategica pentru aliatii estici ai NATO”
, a concluzionat vicepresedintele Parlamentului European, europarlamentarul PSD Ioan Mircea Pascu.

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