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Comunicat de presa: “Ioan Mircea Pascu despre acordul nuclear cu Iranul: “Masura succesului este politica, nu tehnica”

September 10th, 2015


Strasbourg, 9 septembrie 2015,
Europarlamentarul PSD, vicepresedinte al Parlamentului European si al Comisiei pentru afaceri externe, Ioan Mircea Pașcu a subliniat miercuri n plenul de la Strasbourg n timpul dezbaterii privind acordul nuclear cu Iranul: “Cred ca masura reala a succesului sau esecului acestui Acord este una politica. Mai exact (…) va fi Iranul mai cooperant sau mai provocator?”
Europarlamentarul PSD a punctat:
“Planul comun, cuprinzator de actiune in privinta Iranului a fost semnat la Viena, pe 14 iulie 2015, in urma unor negocieri intense si complexe.
Inaltul Reprezentant pentru politica externa si de securitate al Uniunii Europene si echipa sa au jucat un rol esential in semnarea Acordului. Potrivit acestui document, Iranul isi va reduce considerabil eforturile in domeniul nuclear, iar comunitatea internationala va ridica, treptat, sanctiunile impuse Iranului.
Dimensiunea nucleara nu este singurul si, din punctul meu de vedere, nici macar cel mai relevant etalon de evaluare a acordului semnat la Viena. Cred ca masura reala a succesului sau esecului acestui acord este una politica. Mai exact: in ce masura influenta regionala a Iranului va spori sau se va reduce in urma recapatarii respectabilitatii internationale de catre Teheran ca urmare a semnarii Acordului la Viena?
Intrebarea este: va fi Iranul mai cooperant sau mai provocator? Si chiar daca va fi cooperant, ar trebui sa fim constienti de faptul ceilalti actori din regiune ar putea sa se simta antagonizati de aceasta nou-descoperita relatie de cooperare dintre UE si Iran”.

Comunicat de presa: “Ioan Mircea Pascu despre conflictul intra-arab si destructurarea Orientului Mijlociu”

September 10th, 2015

Strasbourg, 9 septembrie 2015


Europarlamentarul PSD, vicepresedinte al Parlamentului European si al Comisiei pentru afaceri externe, Ioan Mircea Pascu a subliniat miercuri in plenul Parlamentului European de la Strasbourg: “Este numai o chestiune de timp pana cand noul conflict intra-arab va deveni dominant, mpingand vechiul conflict israeliano-palestinian ntr-o pozitie secundara si fortandu-ne sa ne revizuim politicile si aliantele traditionale n ncercarea de a ne adapta noului mediu regional”. Totodata, Ioan Mircea Pascu a accentuat: “Instabilitatea din regiunea mult mai larga a Orientului Mijlociu, reverberatiile acesteia in comunitatile musulmane din Europa, precum si actualul “tsunami de imigranti” sunt consecintele procesului de destructurare carora suntem deja nevoiti sa le facem fata”.


Interventia europarlamentarului PSD a avut loc in cadrul dezbaterii pe marginea Declaratiei Inaltului Reprezentant pentru politica externa si de securitate al Uniunii Europene, Federica Mogherini privind Rolul UE in procesul de pace din Orientul Mijlociu.

Ioan Mircea Pascu a declarat:

“Orientul Mijlociu a fost una dintre zonele de conflict cele mai importante si persistente in vecinatatea Uniunii Europene.

La un moment dat in timpul Razboiului Rece (in 1973, de pilda), un razboi in aceasta regiune ar fi putut chiar declansa o confruntare directa intre cele doua superputeri. In genere, factorul dominant in Orientul MIjlociu a fost – si din anumite puncte de vedere, continua sa fie – conflictul israeliano-palestinian.

Solutia reprezentata de recunoasterea a doua state [Israel si Palestina] a fost si este inca singura realizabila si, de aceea, acceptabila in incercarea de a solutiona acest conflict.

Cu toate acestea, in urma Primaverii Arabe, [in Orientul Mijlociu] a aparut un nou conflict, de aceasta data unul intra-arab, intre siiti si suniti. Avansurile recente ale ISIS n Siria (unde razboiul civil continua cu aceeasi intensitate), in Irak, precum si in Libia – unde divizarea politica a tarii a complicat si mai mult situatia – sugereaza un ‹‹proces de destructurare›› care poate avea consecinte periculoase si imprevizibile.

In aceste conditii, este numai o chestiune de timp pana cand acest nou conflict [intra-arab] va deveni dominant, mpingand vechiul conflict israeliano-palestinian ntr-o pozitie secundara si fortandu-ne sa ne revizuim politicile si aliantele traditionale n ncercarea de a ne adapta noului mediu regional.

Desigur, acest lucru nu inseamna ca trebuie sa abandonam eforturile de a solutiona vechiul conflict israeliano-palestinian. Inseamna, insa, ca “tinta” si cadrul de referinta in care vom fi nevoiti sa actionam vor fi mai ample si de o natura diferita”, a concluzionat vicepresedintele Parlamentului European, europarlamentarul PSD Ioan Mircea Pascu.

Articol publicat de European Leadership Network: “Is it the right time for NATO to resume dialogue with Russia?”

June 24th, 2015


European Leadership Network  


“Is it the right time for NATO to resume dialogue with Russia?”  

By Ioan Mircea Pascu  



Vice-President of the European Parliament and Vice Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Wednesday 24 June 2015

Before deciding whether it is the right time for NATO to resume dialogue with Russia, one should make one thing very clear: the suspension of dialogue with Russia has been in response to the aggressive path adopted by Russia in respect to its neighbour, Ukraine. The illegal annexation of Crimea and the subsequent military destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, both directly and indirectly, through the moral and material support to the separatists are acts challenging the very fibre of the current international and European legal order and security architecture.

The Wales NATO Summit Declaration is unequivocal about it, formulating in consequence a number of precise demands on Russia: “We condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine … We do not and will not recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea. We demand that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border”

The very fact that these demands are still fully valid almost one year after their formulation and after the signing of the Minsk II agreement, indicate that Russia did not implement any of them. Then, the first question would be why should NATO be the one to reverse its position, offering resumption of dialogue with Russia, when the latter did not move one inch towards meeting the Alliances’ demands? Wouldn’t that create a public perception that NATO is “blinking first”, thus undermining both its international credibility and internal cohesion?

And, secondly, why now, when some people even conclude that, for all practical reasons, Russia has already attained its strategic aims vis-à-vis Ukraine: Crimea is now Russian territory, Russia has established a considerable degree of control over Ukraine’s decisions through the military conflict it fuels in the east of the country and NATO and EU membership for Ukraine is off the table.[1]

If one looks at the content of the dialogue with Russia in general, one could notice that it is structured in three domains: first domain is dialogue on specific technical issues (transit towards Afghanistan, for instance). The second domain is dialogue on international issues of mutual interest, like Iran, Syria international terrorism etc. And the third domain is dialogue on any other general issue of common interest, like economic and commercial relations.

Out of the three domains, the second – dialogue on international issues of common interest like Iran, Syria, international terrorism etc – has never been interrupted.[2]

The resumption of dialogue in the third domain – general issues of common interest, like the economy and commercial relations – would seem premature for now. It will convey to the public the wrong message that, by returning to the “business as usual” atmosphere existing before the crisis, Russia (which did nothing of what it has been demanded to do) is rewarded, rather than sanctioned, only because the West is more willing than Russia to return to the good old days of profitable collaboration.

Consequently, the only viable dialogue NATO could offer Russia is on technical issues of mutual interest aimed at “managing” the sudden confrontation generated by Russia’s aggressive moves. The renewed brinkmanship Russia has engaged in lately is capable of producing situations, which could easily get out of control, with devastating consequences. And, in that respect, our recent European Leadership Network (ELN) dialogue in London on that topic has a number of useful suggestions to that effect (CBMs, accords to avoid incidents etc) worth pursuing.

Moreover, such a dialogue would be necessary if one takes into consideration that both Russia’s aggressive military modernization and the response of the West have set in motion relatively long term trends, which would bring about inevitably an increased emphasis on the military dimension in relations between the two sides. It will resemble the Cold War period, when confrontation dominated cooperation, without being a new Cold War, given the degree of interdependence created between the two sides in the meantime.

However, even if dialogue will gradually be resumed with Russia, strategic reassurance of NATO’s eastern allies should be kept firmly in place, both as a material guarantee that, if necessary, Article V of the Washington Treaty shall be honoured and a deterrent to Russia to avoid attempting an attack on the Alliance.

[1] Of course, then there is another question arising: why does Russia keep intervening, risking maintaining the sanctions in place and further international isolation? The only logical answer is that, on the field, there still are some tactical unattained objectives (control over the entire territory of Donetsk and Luhansk and the two land corridors, one towards Crimea through Mariupol and the other from Crimea towards Transnistria through Odessa). Besides, any diminished support for the separatists would incur an internal cost in Russia.

[2] Most probably, because Russia considers – strategically – those issues as of interest to her, too, and – tactically – because she felt probably that it was important to preserve some collaboration, to compensate for the closing of dialogue on most other matters.

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